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Abstract
The Brookings Institution’s new book, The New Germany and the New Europe, is an attempt
along these lines. Actually a collection of twelve scholarly papers, it is an in-depth examination
of the roiled political and economic currents that washed away the Berlin Wall and the rest of the
Iron Curtain and continue to affect the flow of so much of current events. There are two more
substantive shortcomings that pervade the book. The first of these; to be fair, the book shares with
many of the policy debates that presently occur on the planet: a persistent failure to consider the
limits on the willingness of the populations of the NATO countries to bear the costs of what is
recommended, or already underway, and the consequences of reaching those limits. The second
major flaw in the book is related to the first. Little consideration is given to events at the level
at which most people function, namely, the household, the workplace, and the local community.
Keeping these deficiencies in mind, the book does contain a great deal of information and a number
of valuable insights.
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A principle of physical science states that for every action,
there is an equal and opposite reaction. If this principle were
to apply in political science, one could hypothesize that the dis-
integration of the former Eastern bloc is offset by the grad-
ual-albeit fitful-integration of western Europe, and the
reunification of Germany is balanced by the sundering of the
former Soviet Union. Although perhaps an intriguing hypoth-
esis, it would serve only a desire for simplistic explanations.
These continuing events have the potential to overwhelm the
current European, if not the world, political, and economic or-
der. They have a complexity of genesis and progress that can
even more easily overwhelm observers. Understanding them
is, thus, both a pressing need and a tall order.
An attempt to consider these events in definitive detail
carries three risks. First, accuracy may suffer when the per-
spective that can come only with temporal distance from such
events is foregone. Second, the time required for analysis can
easily allow the moving target, which unfolding history un-
avoidably constitutes, to move beyond the range of one's aim.
Third, because so many of those qualified to conduct such
analysis are caught up in some way in the events themselves,
the analysis can create an effect that has its physical parallel in
the Heisenberg Uncertainty principle: the conclusions or even
the process can affect the events. But this last risk returns us to
the need and is the very point of the analysis. If the events are
not to overwhelm us, we must have enough understanding to
work with them.
The Brookings Institution's new book, The New Germany
* Member of the Firm, Walter, Conston, Alexander & Green, P.C., New York
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and the New Europe,l is an attempt along these lines. Actually a
collection of twelve scholarly papers, it is an in-depth examina-
tion of the roiled political and economic currents that washed
away the Berlin Wall and the rest of the Iron Curtain and con-
tinue to affect the flow of so much of current events. Many of
the papers are also efforts to chart a course that will allow suc-
cessful navigation to future security and prosperity for the na-
tions and populations involved.
The original papers were presented in September 1991,
but have been updated to reflect the authors' thinking as of the
summer of 1992. Although subsequent events, such as the Eu-
ropean currency crisis, the spread of violence directed against
foreigners in Germany, and the results of the French referen-
dum on the Treaty on European Union ("Maastricht treaty") 2
and the U.S. presidential election, are already accumulating to
the point where they call the currency of some of the papers'
observations into question, the book is nonetheless enlighten-
ing. It is not always an easy read for one not, already well
versed on current European events. There is, however, an
early warning at the front of the book in the form of a two-page
list of "Abbreviations and Acronyms," chiefly an alphabet soup
of economic and political accords and organizations that are
more the jargon'of policy "wonks" than of those with a 'less
professional interest.3 A number of widely used and under-
stood terms are nowhere to be found and are supplanted by
acronyms that are presumably either more precise or more po-
litically correct in the relevant circles, for instance, COMECON
and the Warsaw Pact are referred to as "CMEA" (Council for
Mutual Economic Assistance) and "WTO" (Warsaw Treaty
Organization), respectively.4
There are two more substantive shortcomings that per-
vade the book. The first of these; to be fair, the book shares
with many of the policy debates that presently occur on the
planet: a persistent failure to consider the limits on the will-
ingness of the populations of the NATO countries to bear the
1. THE NEW GERMANY AND THE NEW EUROPE (Paul B. Stares ed., 1992) [hereinaf-
ter THE NEW GERMANY].
2. Treaty on European Union, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. 719 [hereinafter TEU], re-
pinted in 31 I.L.M. 253 (1992).
3. THE NEW GERMANY, supra note 1, at xiii-xiv.
4. Id.
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costs of what is recommended, or already underway, and the
consequences of reaching those limits. Many of the authors
observe that it was the East German people (chanting in the
streets: "Wir sind das Volk!" and later, "Wir sind ein Volk!"), 5
their perception of their economic self-interest, and their de-
termination to act on that interest, that utterly overwhelmed
the ability of several of the world's politically most sophisti-
cated, and militarily and economically most powerful govern-
ments to control even the pace of events, much less their
course, resulting in the unanticipated and abrupt timing of
German reunification. But, none of the authors seriously con-
siders either the possibility that the populations that are ex-
pected to finance the staggering cost of the new Europe as en-
visioned by the authors could reach the balking point, or the
potential political consequences when they do. The recent
German riots6 and the electoral defeat of an incumbent U.S.
president who once enjoyed the highest approval rating in the
history of polling,7 are blunt reminders that these populations
will not docilely tolerate significant erosion of their standards
of living.
There is a broad consensus among the book's authors on
what must be accomplished if the aftermath of German reunifi-
cation, and of the other events that were its context and con-
tributing causes, is to allow continued progress toward a stable
Europe. There are three main themes to the recommenda-
tions: (1) the development of multilateral organizations and
other contacts to imbed the unified Germany in a cooperative
European security effort; (2) limitations on armies and arma-
ments; and (3) economic development of the former Eastern
bloc. Several contributors present some macroeconomic anal-
yses of the German economy's ability to bear the costs of
reunification, primarily the cost of the economic transforma-
tion of the new, eastern Lnder8 (including infrastructure and
environment), and their sustenance in the meantime. But
there is no effort to analyze the potential impact of reunifica-
5. Id. at 16, 59 (meaning respectively "We Are the People," "We Are One Peo-
ple").
6. See, e.g., Germans Fear a Riot Backlash, N.Y. TiMES, Aug. 29, 1992, at 2.
7. R.W. Apple, Jr., The 1992 Elections: News Analysis; The Economy's Casualty, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 4, 1992, at Al.
8. The states of the Federal Republic of Germany (singular: Land).
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tion on the average German household, whether west or east.
And, without such information, it would seem impossible to
discern accurately the likely political future.
It sometimes seems that most of those engaged in policy
debates nowadays purposefully ignore the truly difficult, but
absolutely central, issue of cost. For quite some time, there
has been a chorus advocating significant U.S. government aid
for the former eastern bloc, but there is no suggestion of how
this can be financed by a nation with a deficit that exceeds the
budgets of most of the countries it is supposed to be aiding.
The result is that virtually no such aid has been forthcoming.
Similarly, a number of the authors of these assembled papers
expansively discuss the German spending that "needs" to take
place, especially in what was East Germany, but also in the rest
of the former eastern bloc. They do not, however, face the fact
that meeting all the needs they identify would almost certainly
necessitate a reduction in the standard of living of much of the
population of the former West Germany. Perhaps they cannot
accept the possibility that the people of a prosperous democ-
racy would decline to pursue fully the idealistic and idealized
vision that the authors offer, or perhaps they are unwilling to
jeopardize the acceptance of the goals they propose by re-
vealing their full implications. Many of the authors recount the
political damage to Chancellor Kohl from his making false
promises about the cost of reunification, but, again, some of
the lesson seems to have been lost.
The second major flaw in the book is related to the first.
Little consideration is given to events at the level at which most
people function, namely, the household, the workplace, and
the local community. It was largely at this level that the Iron
Curtain-especially in Germany-was demolished. Yet, the
authors of this book proceed as if the aftermath of these events
can nonetheless be fully charted by focusing at the level of na-
tional governments and economies. In fact, much of the eco-
nomic transformation of Eastern Europe being effected now is
taking place at "lower" levels. Moderate sized-companies, par-
ticularly the German mittelstdndische Unternehmen,9 are spreading
out across Eastern Europe, hiring locals, bringing them to the
9. Companies with either an annual turnover of DM2,000,000 to DMI0,000,000
or 20 to 100 employees. I MITrEL-STANDISCHE UNTERNEHMEN vii (1991).
5651992-1993]
566 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL L WJOURNAL [Vol.16:562
home base for training, and then sending them back. This is
how the economies and societies involved will be transformed,
by a propagation of western systems and values, driven by dis-
parately plotted, individual, economic self-interests. The im-
plicit assumption of this book that this can be accurately ana-
lyzed in the amalgam is questionable.
Keeping these deficiencies in mind, the book does contain
a great deal of information and a number of valuable insights.
In chapter two of The New Germany, Catherine McArdle
Kelleher, a senior fellow in the Foreign Policy Studies program
at the Brookings Institution itself,' gives her overview of "The
New Germany."" The paper is an excellent introduction for
the rest of the book. She ably recounts how the post-World
War II political history of the two German republics led up the
events of reunification. 12 Her discussion comes close to cap-
turing the feel of this history, which resembled nothing so
much as the long, slow assent and the sudden descent at the
start of a roller coaster ride. She includes an excellent sum-
mary of the current economic situation.'"
A significant part of her paper is a fascinating discussion
of the effects of reunification and its economic aftermath on
German party politics and their potential future course for the
near term.'4 She points out that unresolved issues that go to
the State-Federation ("Land-Bund") relationship are build-
ing. t' Resolution of these issues will almost certainly increase
the already serious regional strains within the political parties.
She omits, however, any mention of the effect on the SPD's' 6
fortunes in the eastern Ldnder of the image problems that de-
rived from its history of espousing accommodation with the
former communist regime. Perhaps the recent death of former
Chancellor and Ostpolitik '7 architect Willy Brandt will assist the
party in moving beyond that issue, but as of her writing he was
10. THE NEW GERMANY, supra note 1, at 387.
11. Id. at 11.
12. Id. at 13-15.
13. Id. at 28-33.
14. Id. at 33-40.
15. Id. at 35.
16. Id. at xiv. The Sozial Demokratische Partei Deutchlands ("SPD") is the Social
Democratic Party of Germany.'
17. Id. at 14 (discussing the "new Ostpolitik (policy toward the East) within the
opposition Social Democratic party").
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still alive. Ms. Kelleher accurately describes the growing dis-
satisfaction with the CDU/CSU. t8 She fails to take full account
of the fact that, on the most important issue of how to cope
with the economic effects of reunification, the opposition SPD
has not articulated any alternative program. Additionally, on
what may be the second most important issue, the refugee/
asylum issue, the SPD's announced position was then seriously
at odds with the trend in German public opinion. 9 These
political facts and their implications are an inescapable part of
understanding the German political course between the pres-
ent and the next election, which must be held by 1994.
In a discussion of national identity, she maintains that the
two pillars of the former East German identity were pride in its
economic achievements and antifascism, the belief that the
DDR20 had been cleansed of the Nazi past. She implicitly
questions the latter myth, but does not go on to discuss the
rapidly accumulating evidence that the residents of the new
Ldnder are actually significantly behind their western country-
men in working their way through the legacy of the Nazi era, or
the implications of this fact for the evolution in national iden-
tity that is taking place.
The next paper, "The Political Economy of the New Ger-
many, ' 1 was authored by Professor Michael Kreile of the Uni-
versity of Konstanz. 22 He briefly reviews the events of reunifi-
cation. There are subtle differences between his German view
and that of Ms. Kelleher. Of particular legal significance, he
presents a concise description of the treaties, legislation, and
German constitutional provisions that enacted reunification."
Professor Kreile engages in his own discussion of some aspects
of party politics, focusing more on the nature of the relation-
18. Id. at 14-15 (discussing the allied Christliche Demokratische Union (Christian
Democratic Union) and Christlich Soziale Union (Christian Social Union, its Bavarian
sister party).
19. See Craig R. Whitney, Bonn Hopes to Act More Quickly on Asylum, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 17, 1992, at A7. In a party conference on November 16, 1992, the SPD
dropped its opposition to constitutional changes that would allow rulings on asylum
applications to be made within weeks of the application, rather than years as has been
the case. Id.
20. THE NEW GERMANY, supra note. 1, at xiii. The former Deutsche Demokratishe
Republik (German Democratic Republic) was known as East Germany. Id.
21. Id. at 55.
22. Id. at 388.
23. Id. at 61-63.
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ship between the parties and various groups of voters rather
than the relationship between the parties and the issues on
which Ms. Kelleher had focused. But his ultimate conclusion is
that the relationship between eastern voters and the parties is
in fact almost completely issue determined.24
The meat of the paper is an exploration of the relationship
between politics and monetary policy through the events of
reunification and in the present.25 He includes mention of the
role of labor unions in this relationship. This role is critical to
note at this juncture because the impact of labor unions' posi-
tions on economic issues has been growing with the volume
and resolve with which they are expressing those positions. 6
Finally, he chronicles in good detail the fiscal legislation to
date concerning the financing of the costs of reunification: the
discussion is appropriately sub-titled "Federalism Under
Stress."27 These decisions have woven a complex web of eco-
nomics and politics, a web in which the government or even
the national economy may soon find itself uncomfortably en-
meshed. There are intersections of various strands of this web
that may constitute political or economic time bombs. One ex-
ample may be that the current exclusion of the eastern Ldnder
from horizontal fiscal equalization of Value Added Tax
("VAT") revenue, which would result in a significant redistri-
bution of VAT income to the east, is scheduled to expire at the
end of 1994, and could thus easily become a difficult and divi-
sive issue in the next election campaign. Professor Kreile
predicts that the eastern Lnder will begin to differentiate in
the rate and nature of their economic development.28 This is
an almost novel view that once expressed seems virtually self-
evident and is almost certainly accurate, but it is a view that has
not yet emerged as the important point in the discussions of
the future of the east that it deserves to be.
There follows a paper entitled "The Security Policy of the
New Germany' 29 by Hilmar Linnenkamp, a director of the De-
partment of the Social Sciences at the German Federal Armed
24. Id. at 65.
25. Id. at 71-84.
26. Id. at 74-86.
27. Id. at 80.
28. Id. at 84-85.
29. Id. at 93.
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Forces Command and General Staff College (Fiihrungsakademie
der Bundeswehr) in Hamburg.3 0 He tellingly points out that
Thomas Mann's famous dictum that Germany should strive for
a European Germany rather than a German Europe (referred
to by a fair number of the book's authors) simply begs the
question of what is meant by a European Germany. 3  He de-
scribes the effect of the provisions of the Treaty on Conven-
tional Forces in Europe 32 and the Two-Plus-Four Treaty"3 on
the size and shape of the Bundeswehr, as well as the impact of
NATO London Declaration.3 4 He assesses the new security en-
vironment of the unified Germany and its implications for Ger-
man security policy in the future.
Mr. Linnenkamp touches on the debate about whether
there should be revision of the Basic Law provisions gov-
erning deployment of German forces, a debate triggered by
the Gulf War. 5 He observes, in what is equal parts pithy
frankness and understatement, that "[t]he long-established
tendency in West German foreign policy to revert to the Basic
Law as an instrument for circumventing political decisions on
delicate foreign policy issues must have been irritating to other
countries."' 36 He goes on to suggest that the political consen-
sus has grown out of this tendency. We shall see.
His final conclusions are that economic, demographic, and
environmental risks are probably the most serious threats to
security now faced by Germany, and that these are transna-
tional risks, all the more reason for a cornerstone of German
30. Id. at 388.
31. Id. at 94-95.-
32. Id. at 96-97; Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, Nov. 19,
1990, 30 I.L.M. 1 (1991) [hereinafter CFE Treaty].
33. THE NEw GERMANY, supra note 1, at 97-98; Treaty on the Final Settlement
with Respect to Germany, Sept. 12, 1990, S. TREATY Doc. No. 20, 101st Cong., 2d
Sess. (1990) [hereinafter Two-Plus-Four Treaty], reprinted in 29 I.L.M. 1186 (1990).
34. THE NEW GERMANY, supra note 1, at 98-99; London Declaration on a Trans-
formed North Atlantic Alliance, July 6, 1990, reprinted in 26 WKLY. COMPILATION
PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS 1041 (July 9, 1990) (President's news conference following
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Summit in London) [hereinafter London
NATO Declaration]; see generally Peter E. Quint, The Constitutional Law of German Unifi-
cation, 50 MD. L. REV. 475 (1991) (discussing impact of London NATO Declaration
on Germany).
35. THE NEw GERMANY, supra note 1, at 108-09. The Basic Law is effectively the
current German constitution.
36. Id. at 118.
37. Id.
5691992-19931
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security policy to be a commitment to multilateral coopera-
tion.38 The paper fails, however, to take note of the fact that
one driving force behind the reduction of armed forces around
the world is the irresistible pressure from the populations that
have been supporting the forces to redistribute resources away
from the military sector toward meeting other needs. This
pressure will have continuing, progressive effects throughout
the world, and Europe will be no exception. The paper's views
on the potential shape of the future could benefit from re-visi-
tation following the intervening election to the U.S. presidency
of Bill Clinton, who has advocated withdrawals of U.S. forces
from Europe that go beyond those assumed.39
Next up is Harald Miiller, director of International Pro-
grams at the Peace Research Institute Frankfurt,4" with a dis-
cussion of "German Foreign Policy After Unification."'" The
bulk of his paper explores the debate concerning, and the ef-
fectuation of, Germany's policy regarding each of a series of
issues: the Gulf War, 42 the broader question of out-of-area
military missions generally,43 export policy 44 (particularly as it
concerns weapons technology), German-Polish and German-
Czechoslovakian relations, 45 Yugoslavia, 46 NATO after the de-
mise of the Warsaw Pact,47 and European Community integra-
tion.48 The discussion does an excellent job of tracing and ex-
plaining the evolution of these policies, extending even to the
interplay with the fault lines in the political opposition, but
also has undertones that are at times self-congratulatory and at
others defensive. He accurately points out that Germany has
included consultations with others in the development of its
policies more than any other industrial democracy and that
there is a patent inconsistency between calls for Germany to
38. Id. at 121-22.
39. Craig R. Whitney, Bush or Clinton, Europe Expects No Shift in Foreign Policy, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 27, 1992, at Al.
40. THE NEw GERMANY, supra note 1, at 388.
41. Id. at 126.
42. Id. at 135-39.
43. Id. at 139-42.
44. Id. at 142-46.
45. Id. at 146-50.
46. Id. at 150-54.
47. Id. at 154-58.
48. Id. at 158-61.
NEW GERMANY AND NEW EUROPE
exercise its potential for leadership and the agitated reactions
that ensue whenever Germany does so.49 On the other hand,
showing that there is a rational basis for a given policy does
not at all mean that it was the natural, much less the only or
"best" choice, or that others with differing interests necessarily
ought to endorse the policy.
The credibility of his presentation is strained by the effort
to explain Germany's decision to proceed'with recognition of
Croatia.5 ° There were indeed major arguments in favor of the
decision that had nothing to do with the German-Croatian alli-
ance in World War II. This is not enough, however, to con-
clude as does the author that "[i]t is safe to say . . .. that this
historical association played no part whatsoever in Germany's
considerations ' "5 when, on the very same page, he acknowl-
edges that one of the considerations in the decision was do-
mestic pressure that stemmed from centuries old sympathies
between south German Catholics and the Catholic Croatians. 52
The German-Croatian alliance in World War II has a relation-
ship to these same sympathies and cannot be so easily excised
from its context.
The paper also ignores a brewing dilemma that is stu-
diously avoided in current policy discussions in Germany.
There is an obvious conflict between the German leadership's
approach toward economic integration of the European Com-
munity and the German public's concerns in the area of mone-
tary policy. The German consensus that inflation is the great-
est monetary enemy and needs to be avoided at almost any
cost sets Germany significantly apart from the other members
of the Community. Chancellor Kohl's insistence on an in-
dependent central bank as a condition of economic integration
is touted as adequate insurance that the German attitude vis-a-
vis inflation will not be overcome in the upcoming union. Un-
fortunately, simply saying this does not make it so. The U.S.
experience with the Federal Reserve Bank suggests strongly
that the independence of a central bank can never be complete
and does not predetermine monetary policy.
49. Id. at 129-30, 161-62.
50. Id. at 151-54.
51. Id. at 152-53.
52. Id. at 153.
1992-19931
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The second part of the book has a broader, European fo-
cus. The first of these chapters is the paper "Toward a New
European Political Economy" by Wolfgang H. Reinicke," a re-
search associate in the Foreign Policy Studies program of the
Brookings Institution. 54 He presents a convincing and com-
prehensive discussion of the depth and complexity of the prob-
lem presented by the movement to transform the economy of
eastern Europe.55 In addition, he offers a theoretical basis for
the plan, design, and implementation of the transformation.56
(This theoretical discussion also provides a good basis for the
understanding of the tremendous problems being experienced
in the former Soviet Union.) Mr. Reinicke points out that a
market economy assumes a market made up of individuals who
are comfortable with risk, uncertainty, and spontaneity, and
that the population of the former east bloc countries simply
does not fit this bill, which will necessitate a social and psycho-
logical transformation of these societies; it will not be enough
just to privatize the economy and to dismantle the central plan-
ning authority.57 In this context, he points to the dramatic fall-
off of voter participation in succeeding elections in the former
east bloc countries, which carries with it alarming implications
for the viability of democratic representative government in
those countries. 58 He also points out that successful market
economies as we know them also have an extensive legal and
administrative component, made up of everything from gov-
ernment regulations and agencies to labor unions, consumer
groups, and chambers of commerce, which will also be essen-
tial to the economic evolution in eastern Europe.59
The second focus of the paper is the restructuring of the
European Community, dealing with both the conceptual
dimensions of the "widening" and "deepening" of the organi-
zation and the practical aspect of the necessary modification of
the association agreements. In academic language, the author
acknowledges the politico-economic quandary discussed at the
53. Id. at 177.
54. Id. at 388.
55. Id. at 180-89.
56. Id. at 178-80.
57. Id. at 180-85.
58. Id. at 188-89.
59. Id. at 180-89.
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outset of this review. He states that "Europeans will reject
deeper economic integration unless they believe that they can
exchange their social contract at the national level for a Euro-
pean social contract without giving up the rights and responsi-
bilities they have acquired." 60 However, having made the
statement, he leaves the potential breadth and depth of its im-
plications unexamined.
Paul B. Stares, the book's editor and a senior fellow in the
Foreign Policy Studies program at the Brookings Institution,6 l
and John D. Steinbruner, a director of the same program, fol-
low with "Cooperative Security in the New Europe."62 It is a
highly theoretical, statistic-laden and mind-numbing approach
to determining appropriate troop levels and distribution.
They also relate their conclusions to the present framework of
multilateral agreements and suggest initiatives to implement
those conclusions.
The last part of the book offers five perspectives on the
new Germany. Anne-Marie Le Gloannec, a research fellow at
the Center of International Studies and Research of the Na-
tional Foundation of Political Science in Paris,63 writes on the
implications for Western Europe. She articulates the key, un-
answered question: will the integration of the unified Ger-
many with the rest of Europe in fact limit its influence or, be-
cause its relative size and importance will mean that no crucial
decision can be made without its consent, will an integrated
Europe instead enhance Germany's domination?
Andras Inotai, a director of the Institute for World Eco-
nomics of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences in Budapest, 64
writes on the economic implications of German reunification
for eastern Europe. He dissents from the conventional wis-
dom that blames the sharp decline in east German exports to
eastern and central Europe on the collapse of COMECON,
blaming it instead on the currency union, which drastically in-
creased the effective price of East German goods and instantly
priced them out of competitiveness in their former customer
60. Id. at 202.
61. Id. at 218.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 251.
64. Id. at 279.
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countries. 65 His is an interesting perspective on the decision
to exchange Deutschmarks for "Ostmarks ' 66 at a one to one
rate, since commentary on that decision has tended to focus
almost exclusively on its effects on the internal German econ-
omy. He notes that Germany has already assumed the major
trading role with the former Soviet satellites and now accounts
for approximately the same proportion of their trade as the
Soviet Union once did, a stunning fact that underlines the scale
of what change has already occurred.67 Mr. Inotai focuses on
the conflicting demands that east German development and
development in the rest of eastern Europe place on German
resources. He sharply, criticizes the decision by Germany to
favor development of its new eastern Lnder, which he attrib-
utes to "[p]olitical motivations, '"68 and almost bitterly suggests
that part of that money would have been better spent in other
east European countries. While his position may be under-
standable, it is not politically reasonable, any more than one
could effectively lecture the United States government on the
wisdom of eliminating water projects in the western United
States to free up funds for aid to the Caribbean.
"Security Problems Facing Central and Eastern Europe
After German Unification" is the tenth chapter, authored by
Slawomir A. Dabrowa, deputy director of the Department of
European Institutions of the Polish Ministry of Foreign Af-
fairs.69 He, too, worries about the eastern Lnder consuming
German capital, but points out that progress towards a united
Europe is dependent on a unified Germany. As perhaps a Pole
would soonest realize, he notes now that the German problem
has been "solved," the Russian question has emerged.70
That nation is heard from next. Sergei A. Karaganov,
deputy director of the Russian Academy of Sciences Institute
of Europe in Moscow, 7 1 writes on the "Implications of German
Unification for the Former Soviet Union." Part of his paper
recounts the Soviet policy decisions and actions in response to
65. Id. at 280-82.
66. The currency of the former DDR.
67. THE NEw GERMANY, supra note 1, at 279-80.
68. Id. at 300.
69. Id. at 305.
70. Id. at 305-06.
71. Id. at 331.
NEW GERMANY AND NEW EUROPE
the events that resulted in German reunification. In the detail
in which he presents these maneuvers, they often appear des-
perate or even pathetic when one remembers the former geo-
political position that the Soviet Union once held. His closing
remarks are haunting: "During this century, Germany has
twice been in a situation similar to the one the former Soviet
Union-especially Russia-finds itself in now. The first time it
was abandoned; the second time it was helped."' 72
The last chapter, which strains to fit in, is "Implications of
German Unification for Japan," by Hidea Sato, director of the
Office of Educational Planning at the University of Tsukuba.
Although his discussion of trade tensions between Japan and
Europe has value, it has little relationship to the rest of the
book and one is left wondering why the chapter was included.
The book's greatest use will be as an important and de-
tailed record of a "snap-shot" of the discussion of German
reunification and related eastern European matters at the time
of its publication. It is far too academic in approach to be of
widespread interest. The book deserves a "B+" for its de-
scription of the events of German reunification; what it lacks in
its account of the events in the streets, it partly makes up for by
the details of the events at other levels. For its discussion of
how the current issues it selects for consideration have
emerged and evolved, the book deserves an "A," but the selec-
tion can make no pretense to be comprehensive. For the ex-
tent to which it realistically assesses the future course, perhaps
a "B"; some obvious issues for the future have'been given in-
adequate treatment. It is nonetheless the most thorough treat-
ment of the subject available to date.
72. Id. at 361.
73. Id. at 365.
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